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The US and the European Union (EU) are confronted to-
day by a surge of populist nationalism that presents mul-
tiple challenges to transatlantic democracy. Populism is a 
form of grassroots rebellion against governing elites with 
a long history and complex relationship to democracy, as 
illustrated by two historical examples, the rebellions in 
colonial America and post-1989 Czechoslovakia, both of 
which led to democratic governments, and two contrary 
contemporary examples, in the US and Hungary, which 
have gone in the opposite direction. 
This policy brief looks into the causes of the current wave 
of populist-nationalist rebellion, the challenges it pre-
sents for transatlantic democracy and the potential for 
democratic resilience on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Causes 
Clashing forces were set in motion by the Fall of the Berlin 
Wall. First were the forces of integration – the falling of all 
kinds of borders, from the collapse of the Iron Curtain, to 
the spread of economic and cultural globalization, the rise 
of a communications revolution, the integration of Eastern 
and Western Europe, the growth of democracy and the 
market economy, and the expansion of the European Un-
ion and NATO -- all leading to what Francis Fukuyama 
(1989) optimistically called at the time, “the end of his-
tory”. 
But equally powerful were the forces of disintegration – 
the dark side of globalization, including the movement of 
industries overseas and the loss of jobs and income, the 
financial crises, bank bailouts and growing economic ine-
quality, 9/11 and the major terrorist attacks in Europe and 
the US, the rise of ethnic conflict and genocide and the col-
lapse of countries like Yugoslavia and Rwanda, as well as 
mass migration from failed states in the Middle East, Africa 
and Latin America – all leading to populist-nationalist po-
litical movements in Hungary, Poland, Italy, the United 
Kingdom, the US and other countries. 
Executive Summary 
> The United States and the European Union are con-
fronted today by a surge of populist nationalism 
driven by rebellion against governing elites. This 
presents multiple challenges to transatlantic de-
mocracy. 
 
> The rise of economic globalization and a collision of 
social values since the end of the Cold War has pro-
duced widespread anxiety, economic disruption and 
a corrosive politics of fear. This has led to economic 
rebellion by people left behind by globalization, 
from which elites have disproportionately benefit-
ted, and social and cultural rebellion by national and 
ethnic majorities feeling threatened by minorities, 
immigration and European integration promoted by 
governing elites. 
 
> A prime example of these trends is Hungary, which 
has become a European laboratory for populist na-
tionalism. Prime Minister Viktor Orbán’s soft au-
thoritarianism is based on populist-nationalist ma-
nipulation, and his success has made him the strong-
man of the far right on both sides of the Atlantic. 
Similar populist-nationalist movements emerged 
around Brexit in the UK and the Tea Party in the US, 
exacerbating centrifugal forces in the EU and leading 
to the election of Donald Trump in the US.  
 
> Democratic institutions in the US and the EU – the 
electoral process, the media, the courts, law en-
forcement, civil service and above all, civil society – 
are potential sources of democratic resilience. The 
dangers democracy faces today can in fact stimulate 
its revival if populist-nationalist forces and the 
broader civil society are able to work together in a 
movement for economic fairness and democratic re-
newal. 
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What happened when the forces of integration and disin-
tegration collided? An ongoing cataclysm produced mass 
uncertainty, social anxiety and economic disruption, lead-
ing to a corrosive anti-democratic politics of fear.  
This anti-democracy disease has attacked core elements of 
democratic governance: free and fair elections, freedom 
of speech, freedom of the press, an independent judiciary, 
the rule of law, minority rights, civil liberties, checks and 
balances against concentrations of power, and public 
goods like health, education and welfare. These are safe-
guards against tyranny, and were among the products of 
the rebellions in America in 1775 and Czechoslovakia in 
1989. 
Today, many people on both sides of the Atlantic do not 
believe that democracy is working for them. Discontent 
has been building for years. In 2014 a European Commis-
sion poll found that 68% of Europeans distrusted their 
democratic leaders and governments – up from only 25% 
in 2002. A Gallup poll in the same year showed almost 
identical results: 65% of Americans were dissatisfied, up 
from 21% in 2002. 
These polls reflected anger at political and economic elites 
who were promoting the forces of integration in both Eu-
rope and the US.  In Europe an elite consensus formed af-
ter 1989 around three ideas: EU integration, neo-liberal 
market economics and multi-ethnic diversity. This created 
the image of Europe as technocratic, corporate and cos-
mopolitan. Two decades later many average Europeans 
could not relate to this image. They felt buffeted by the 
forces of disintegration, especially after the financial and 
economic crises after 2008, which created economic hard 
times, and the migration crisis of 2015, which produced 
cultural and demographic anxiety.  
Forms of populist rebellion 
The forces of disintegration led to two forms of populist 
rebellion in Europe and similar outrage in the US. First, 
there was economic rebellion by people left behind by the 
loss of jobs, stagnating middle-class incomes, austerity 
programmes and cuts in social welfare, all of which re-
sulted from the forces of integration and globalization 
from which the elites were disproportionately benefiting. 
Second, there was a social and cultural rebellion by ethnic 
majorities feeling threatened by minorities and outsiders 
and the forces of European integration which the govern-
ing elites were promoting.  
These rebellions were rooted in reactions to the major so-
cial and economic revolutions of our time. First was the 
market revolution, which had promised to stimulate eco-
nomic growth through deregulation, but drastically re-
duced the social safety net by defunding government pro-
grammes and producing growing inequality. Second was 
the civil rights revolution, which had strengthened democ-
racy by broadening the participation of previously ex-
cluded groups, especially women and minorities, but stim-
ulated a counterrevolution by previously dominant major-
ities. Third was the digital revolution, which had created a 
vast increase in communication, but also led to the rise of 
social media echo chambers and facilitated the spread of 
disinformation. 
The reactions to these three revolutions fundamentally al-
tered the playing field of democracy. Market deregulation 
led to the loss of shared benefits of economic growth and 
growing inequality between the top 10% and everyone 
else. Backlash against the civil rights movement led to a 
loss of social solidarity and the rise of a new climate of rac-
ism. And the explosive growth of social media led to the 
loss of common narratives based on fact and truth. 
Out of all this came a deep fear of demographic change by 
people feeling left behind, which fueled the far-right reac-
tionary politics in the US and the EU. Some whites, espe-
cially white men, felt threatened by the racial and cultural 
diversity they believed was being imposed on them by a 
distant and oppressive elite. Former political majorities 
feared their displacement by newly empowered minori-
ties. In the EU, the migration crisis was depicted by right-
wing nationalists like Viktor Orbán as a threat to national 
and European identity. In the US, the rising political 
strength of minority voters sparked campaigns to suppress 
the minority vote. The huge impact and high stakes of 
these demographic fears have been succinctly summa-
rized by Danielle Allen of Harvard: “The world has never 
built a multi-ethnic democracy in which no one ethnic 
group is in the majority”. 
Examples on both sides of the Atlantic: Hungary and the 
US 
A prime example of these trends is Hungary, a contempo-
rary European laboratory for populist nationalism. The fi-
nancial crisis hit Hungarians harder than many other Euro-
peans. After the crisis many felt they were no better off 
than they had been under communism, especially in the 
countryside where 70% of Hungarians live. Hungary has 
been the targets of invasion and outside domination for 
centuries – by Mongols, Turks, Russians, Austrians, Ger-
mans and Soviets. Hungarians had no real experience with 
democracy before 1989, and civil society was weak and 
stunted by the long history of authoritarian rule. This set 
the stage for a populist-nationalist opportunist, and in 
walked Viktor Orbán. 
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Orbán fanned the flames of discontent by playing to Hun-
gary’s victim mentality. He attacked Brussels as “the new 
Moscow”. He warned Hungarians that Middle East mi-
grants were “a threat to Christian civilization”. In 2010, he 
campaigned on the now familiar slogan, “make Hungary 
great again,” and promised Hungarians that he would res-
cue them from Brussels, bankers and socialist holdovers 
from the old regime.  
Most of all, Orbán created a new model of government 
that he called “illiberal democracy”, using democratic elec-
tions to undermine democratic institutions. After the elec-
tions, his party set out to use its parliamentary superma-
jority to rewrite the Hungarian constitution and eliminate 
democratic checks and balances. He subverted an inde-
pendent judiciary by packing the courts, limiting their ju-
risdiction and forcing judges to retire. He took over an in-
dependent media by using political and financial pressure, 
regulation and disinformation. He attacked civil society by 
accusing NGOs of being foreign agents, hitting them with 
heavy fines, taxes and restrictions. He controlled universi-
ties by cutting their funding and overseeing their curricula, 
and in the case of an international privately funded univer-
sity like the Central European University (CEU), by using 
the tools of regulatory repression to make it impossible for 
CEU to issue US-accredited degrees in Hungary. 
The durability of Orbán’s “illiberal democracy” – he has 
now held office for nine years in his second time as Prime 
Minister – has made him the strong-man of the far right 
on both sides of the Atlantic. The former Trump presiden-
tial advisor Steve Bannon has called him “Trump before 
there was Trump”. Orbán is particularly dangerous as a 
soft authoritarian whose political power is based on ma-
nipulation and does not depend on violence, torture or the 
jailing of opponents. In this way, the Orbán model is differ-
ent from fascism, but in other ways it is similar because it 
stirs up populist fears by using racist and anti-Semitic prop-
aganda, like the billboard campaign against George Soros 
that depicts him as a wealthy “foreign manipulator” with 
slogans reminiscent of anti-Semitic dog whistles.  
How does this compare with what’s going on elsewhere in 
Europe and in the US? The same fears and anxieties and 
anger at distant elites have sparked populist-nationalist 
movements like Brexit and the Tea Party in the US. Brexit 
has led to extended political chaos in the UK, and the Tea 
Party Movement has led to the election of Donald Trump. 
Trump and Orbán have much in common.  
There are three models of the Trump presidency, each 
similar to Orbán’s anti-democratic brand. First is the au-
thoritarian model: the President assaults pluralist institu-
tions like the media, which he calls “the enemy of the peo-
ple”, through the blatant use of lying and disinformation 
against fact-based reporting that he attacks as “fake 
news”. Second is the anti-government model: the Trump 
presidency is tearing down the administrative state by de-
regulation, especially on economic and environmental is-
sues, and dismantling the professional civil service. Third 
is the polarization model, which involves appealing to pop-
ulist fear by stimulating racism, smearing opponents and 
destroying the norms of democratic governance. 
Potential sources of resilience  
History shows that democracy can be resilient. In the US, 
bipartisan opposition has stopped power grabs by both 
Democratic and Republican presidents, as three modern 
examples demonstrate. Franklin Roosevelt’s infamous 
scheme to expand the Supreme Court was stopped by 
Congress and the public. Richard Nixon’s notorious Wa-
tergate crimes and cover-up were stopped by the press, 
the courts, the Congress and the public. And George W. 
Bush’s illegal use of torture in the “war on terror” was 
stopped by the courts and the Congress.  
In a 2018 study, “Trump’s First Year: How Resilient is De-
mocracy in the US?” I reviewed nine institutions that make 
up the checks and balances of American democracy (Shat-
tuck, Watson & McDole 2018). These included the media, 
the federal judiciary, law enforcement, the civil service, 
the electoral process, the Congress, presidential norms, 
state and local government and civil society. The study 
found that while all of these institutions had come under 
attack by the Trump presidency, some of them showed re-
silience in resisting presidential abuses of power during 
Trump’s first year. The greatest resistance came from state 
and local government and civil society. Lagging behind 
were the media, federal law enforcement, the federal ju-
diciary, the electoral process and the civil service, all of 
which were struggling but still resistant. The greatest dam-
age to democracy was done by Trump’s attacks on presi-
dential norms and the Republican congressional majority’s 
facilitation of Trump’s abuses. 
Last fall’s midterm elections demonstrated that some as-
pects of American democracy continue to be resilient in 
Trump’s second year. The elections produced the highest 
voter turnout in a non-presidential year by minorities and 
younger voters, despite an ongoing campaign of voter sup-
pression and gerrymandering by Republicans fearing de-
mographic change and the rise of new groups of voters, 
especially minorities, as documented in a March 2019 re-
port, “The War on Voting Rights” (Shattuck, Huang & 
Thoreson-Green 2019). The new Congress is no longer 
controlled by one party, and can, at least theoretically, act 
as a check on presidential power. 
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However, a new test for democracy is ahead: now that the 
investigation of the Trump presidency conducted by Spe-
cial Counsel Robert Mueller is over, it will be up to the Con-
gress and the public to determine what to do about 
Trump’s documented abuses of power. Political polariza-
tion will increase, and the President is stepping up his at-
tacks on the media, on the checks and balances of democ-
racy, and on democracy itself. 
Strengthening checks and balances in a pluralist democ-
racy 
A wide variety of strategies can be employed to strengthen 
checks and balances in a pluralist democracy. The follow-
ing recommendations focus on the US but are equally ap-
plicable to the EU, where populism and nationalism are 
challenging European integration and democratic values. 
The question is whether the dangers democracy faces to-
day can stimulate its revival. Five things will have to hap-
pen for that to come about. 
First, the current wave of populist-nationalist rebellions 
must be recognized as an authentic reaction to the ex-
cesses of globalization and the elites that are promoting it, 
destroying communities and leaving people behind in dy-
ing cities and towns across America and Europe. We may 
not agree with some of the political views of populists, but 
we need to listen and understand their demand for recog-
nition and political response. 
Second, coalitions will need to be built across political di-
vides, putting aside differences on social issues to connect 
with voters demanding economic fairness and opportunity 
on issues like health care, education, taxes and public 
spending. This kind of inclusive populism – as opposed to 
the exclusionary racist brand – can break down the polari-
zation on which Trump thrives. We can take inspiration 
from earlier forms of inclusive populism like the American 
Farmer-Labor Movement of the late 19th century that 
brought together urban workers, rural farmers and black 
sharecroppers, and ultimately led to the Progressive 
Movement of the early 20th century. Following this exam-
ple, there is a potential today for a left-right populist coa-
lition on economic fairness and inequality. 
Third, defenders of democracy need to vote, and encour-
age others to vote in the US and in the EU and its member 
states. Participating in a voter registration campaign in a 
contested swing state in the US where the presidential 
election will be decided is among the most important 
things that can be done to strengthen democracy. Politi-
cians who attack democracy must be punished at the polls. 
This is what began to happen in the US midterm elections 
when 40 incumbents who facilitated President Trump’s 
anti-democratic agenda were defeated. 
Fourth, the idea that liberal democracy is about negotia-
tion more than confrontation must be revitalized. Without 
negotiation there is only polarization, gridlock and conflict, 
which is why people are angry at Washington or Brussels, 
or their national capitals. Ending polarization must be at 
the top of the political agenda. It is what the polls say most 
Americans and Europeans want, and it is what democracy 
most needs. 
Fifth, saving and strengthening democracy must be a pat-
riotic struggle for national survival, not just a liberal politi-
cal cause. For too long liberals have given up the symbols 
of patriotism to the right. They need to reclaim the flag to 
push back the appeal of right-wing identity politics. Patri-
otism and the defense of constitutional democracy are the 
same thing. This was the rallying cry of the patriots in Bos-
ton who started the American Revolution and the dissi-
dents in Czechoslovakia who led the Velvet Revolution in 
1989.  It should be the rallying cry for saving democracy 
today. 
Conclusion 
It took a long time and much struggle to consolidate con-
stitutional democracy after the early populist rebellions. 
At the time the US Constitution was written, one of its 
principal authors, James Madison, described the state of 
political dysfunction in words that could apply to the state 
of transatlantic democracy today: “Complaints are every-
where heard that our governments are unstable and op-
pressive, that the public good is disregarded in the conflict 
of rival parties, and that measures are too often decided 
by the superior force of interested and overbearing politi-
cal powers”.  
To get out of this crisis, factions had to be harnessed by a 
system of checks and balances. Democratic norms had to 
be developed for conflict management and compromise. 
And when these restraints were destroyed in the US by the 
Civil War, the Jim Crow Era and the Gilded Age, they had 
to be rebuilt, spurred on by the Great Depression, two 
World Wars and the Civil Rights Movement. And when 
they were overridden by presidents who abused their au-
thority and power, they had to be restored by public out-
cry and pressure – for example, by calling for the impeach-
ment of Richard Nixon. 
What can citizens do today to strengthen their democ-
racy? Democratic discontent on both sides of the Atlantic 
can be addressed through citizen engagement in the elec-
toral process. The late Speaker of the US House of Repre-
sentatives Thomas P. “Tip” O’Neill famously said that “all 
politics are local”. Democracy begins at home. Local polit-
ical engagement and voting participation are the building 
blocks of democratic governance. A European observer of 
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American democracy, Alexis de Tocqueville, declared that 
“the greatness of America lies not in being more enlight-
ened than other nations, but in her ability to repair her 
faults”. It is the task of citizens on both sides of the Atlantic 
to repair the faults of their democracies by rekindling the 
fervor of the political movements out of which they 
emerged in the first place. 
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